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AIRLINES' RESPONSE TO THE DTPA
SECTION 1305 PREEMPTION
DANIEL PETROSKI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

B EGINNING

WITH THE Air Commerce Act of 1926'
and continuing through the 1984 enactment of Public2
Law 98-443, commonly known as the CAB Sunset Act,
the airline industry has been the subject of pervasive federal regulation.' A more "comprehensive scheme of combined regulation,
subsidization,
and
operational
participation than that which Congress has provided in
the field of aviation" is difficult to visualize. 4 Airplanes
"move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and
under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls." 5 The federal
government has issued Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs), 6 Airworthiness Directives (ADs), 7 and other fed*J.D. University of Houston; Associate, Baker Brown Sharman & Parker,
Houston, Texas. Mr. Petroski was an associate editor of the HOUSTON LAW
REVIEW.
I Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 55 Stat. 568, repealed by Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973.
2 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(1984).
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir.
1981).
New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 172
(1st Cir. 1989).
Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944)).
6 For the power to issue FARs and related procedures, see 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1348(a) (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1990).
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eral regulations through Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations," all in an attempt to provide consistent regulation of the airline industry.9
Congress, however, went one step further in 1978 by
enacting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305, which preempts state
laws that regulate the rates, routes, or services of interstate air carriers.'0 Although a simple reading of this statute suggests that any state law, rule, or regulation that
relates to the "rates, routes, or services" of a title IV air
carrier" is preempted, the majority of states have enacted
unfair trade practice statutes that may directly affect the
air carrier's rates, routes, and particularly, the manner in
2
which they perform their services.'
In general, unfair trade practice statutes allow plaintiffs
to collect not only their actual damages but also to receive
attorney's fees and two or three times the actual damages
as a penalty.' 3 These unfair trade practice statutes, if not
7 For the power to issue AD's and related procedures, see 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1421, 1423 (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 39.1.
8 14 C.F.R. § 1 (1990).
9 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
1049 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The text of the statute
reads as follows:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State
or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other
political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide interstate air transportation.
Id.
' See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371.
21 As early as 1972, a total of 32 states had adopted consumer protection legislation generally prohibiting deceptive acts or practices. New Topic Service, AM.
JUR. Consumer Protection § 205 n.39 (1982); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724 (1972); Sebert, Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practice
Statutes, 42 TENN. L. REV. 689, 691 (1975); Annotation, Consumer Protection-Forbidden Conduct, 89 A.L.R.3d 449, 456 (1979).
I., Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas all have deceptive trade practice acts
(DTPAs) that provide for multiple damages. Of the seventeen, Hawaii and North
Carolina have the provisions most favorable to the plaintiffs, with mandatory
treble damages whenever the plaintiff prevails. D. PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTEC-
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preempted by section 1305, would subject title IV air carriers to greater liability than previously encountered
under general common law theories of liability because
such statutes
allow the court to award reasonable attor4
ney's fees."
Although section 1305 was enacted over ten years ago,
airlines have only recently utilized the provision to avoid
application of the unfair trade practice statutes.' 5 A Texas
district court analyzed the preemption issue when it
granted an injunction enjoining the Texas Attorney General 16 from enforcing any unfair trade practice statutes
against various airlines for false or deceptive advertising.
The injunction was subsequently modified to include
thirty-three other state attorneys general.' 7 Although section 1305 was not specifically cited, the court discussed
preemption of "any state regulation of advertising of the
§ 6.05[3][a] (1988). The DTPAs of California, Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, and Rhode
Island all specifically provide for other punitive damage awards. Furthermore,
punitive damages are judicially available in Arizona and Ohio. Id. § 6.05[4]. Taking overlap into account, twenty-one states now provide enhanced damages under
their DTPAs. This figure does not include states with acts similar to Illinois,
which provides for actual damages plus "any other relief which the court deems
proper." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 270a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). If
jurisdictions that provide for discretionary enhanced damages were included, the
above figures would certainly increase. P. Foss, The Extraterritorial Application
of Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Acts (March 1, 1990)
(speech presented at Journal of Air Law and Commerce Air Law Symposium).
Although this article will address only preemption of the Texas DTPA, the same
principles would apply by analogy to other states,
1
In Texas, attorney's fees may be awarded only if provided for by statute. See
TEX. CIv. PR.c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986); TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987)[Tex. DTPA]. Section 17.50(d)"allows an
injured plaintiff to recover attorney's fees for personal injury actions falling under
the Texas DTPA.
15 For a discussion of the cases that recently began to address section 1305, see
infra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
16 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
11The states added to the injunction were Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. at 105.
TION AND THE LAW
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Plaintiffs' rates, routes, and services." 8 The preemption
issues that arise under deceptive trade practices acts
(DTPAs) are emphasized in the decision. This article will
examine the following areas: (1) the legislative history of
section 1305;' 9 (2) the definition of "rates, routes and
services; ' 20 (3) controversies and questions that surround
section 1305;21 and (4) causes of action that are available
if section 1305 preempts state law actions.22
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Federal Aviation Act of 195823 along with its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,24 set up a comprehensive federal system regulating interstate air
transportation. These statutes established the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to carry out this system of federal
regulation.25
In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA) .26 Section 1305 was included in the ADA in virtually the same form as it exists today. 27 This provision preempted state law relating to rates, routes, or services.28
The basic purpose of the statute was to resolve conflicts
arising from jurisdictional disputes.29
's

Id.at 101.

For a discussion of the legislative history, see infra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
20 For a discussion of the definition of "rates,
routes, or services," see infra
notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
2 For a discussion of the section 1305 controversies, see infra notes 65-156 and
accompanying text.
22 For a discussion of remaining causes of action, see infra notes 157-185 and
accompanying text.
'21
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
24 Pub. L. No. 601, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. v 1987).
2
Hughes Air Corp., 644 F.2d at 1336.
26 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
27 Compare H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, 94-95, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3751-52, 3804-05 [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 1211] with 49 U.S.C. § 1305.
28 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305.
21, H.R. REP. No. 1211, supra note 27, at 15-16.
19
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The evolution of section 1305 is interesting in that the
House and Senate apparently intended preemption of different areas. Section 1305 as originally proposed by the
Senate "prohibit[ed] a State from enacting any law, establishing any standard determining routes, schedules, or
rates, . . . or otherwise promulgating economic regulations
for, any air carrier certified by the Board." 30 Later, the
House amendment dropped the "economic" language,
and the modified statute stated that "when a carrier operates under authority granted pursuant to Title IV of the
Federal Aviation Act, no State may regulate that carrier's
routes, rates or services.9"31 The House amendment was
ultimately adopted. 32 The amendment is significant because it indicates a clear intent on the part of Congress to
expand the scope of federal preemption to all areas relating to routes, rates, or services, not merely economic regulation of the airlines. The expansion was was designed
to promote the underlying "consistency" purpose of the
ADA. 3
In 1984, Congress adopted the CAB Sunset Act. 4 The
fundamental purpose of the Sunset Act was to terminate
some CAB functions and to transfer others to the Department of Transportation (DOT) . 5 The legislature, howExisting law contains no specific provision on the jurisdiction of the
States and the Federal Government over airlines which provide both
intrastate and interstate service. The lack of specific provisions has
created uncertainties and conflicts... H.R. 12611 (§ 1305) will prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations by providing that when a
carrier operates under authority granted pursuant to Title IV of the
Federal Aviation Act, no State may regulate the carrier's routes,
rates or services.

Id.

Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
3Ild. at 94-95.
3
See 49 U.S.C. § 1305.
33 Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1416 n.l 1 (9th Cir.
1984).
.14 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat.
1703 (1984).
." H.R. REP. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2859-60 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 793]. The ADA provided that the CAB would terminate on January 1, 1985, and certain powers
would be transferred to other agencies. Therefore, the CAB Sunset Act was
30
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ever, recognized that the CAB was exercising certain
powers that were not specifically addressed by the ADA,
including the protection of consumers, the prevention of
unfair competitive practices, and the certification of a carrier's fitness for providing air transportation. 6 Because
these areas were not specifically addressed in the ADA, a
substantial amount of discussion is found in the legislative
history about the actual authority for the powers that the
37
CAB was exercising.
A.

Consumer Protection and Unfair Competitive Practices

Congress recognized that various provisions of the Federal Aviation Act granted authority to the CAB to protect
consumers and ensure fair competition.3 8 From 1978, the
CAB exercised this authority in the form of regulations
protecting consumers in the following areas: (1)
overbooking and denied boarding compensation; (2) limitations on liability for lost or damaged baggage; (3) smoking policies; (4) discrimination against the handicapped;
(5) terms of charter service; (6) notice of contractual
terms between the passenger and carrier which airlines
must provide to passengers; and (7) computer reservation
systems standards.3 9 Congress determined that the federal government should continue to have the authority to
protect consumers against unfair and deceptive trade
practices .40
In addition to protecting consumers, the legislature recadopted to provide some guidelines with respect to the powers that would be
transferred to various agencies. Id.
36
37

Id. at 2859.
See generally id.at 2859-63.

38 H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 4; see also Federal Aviation Act, § 404, 49
U.S.C. app. § 1374 (requiring air carriers to provide safe and adequate service,
equipment, and facilities); § 411, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381 (giving the CAB authority
to proceed against unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition); § 204(a), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1324 (empowering the CAB to enact necessary
regulations); § 102, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (providing policy guidelines for the
CAB exercise of authority).
,9 H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 4.
40 Id.
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ognized that federal regulation provides a uniform system
of regulation through preemption of state regulations. 4
Accordingly, Congress transferred to DOT the existing
CAB authority to regulate rates, routes, and services, leaving section 1305 in place to preempt state regulation in
the same area.4 2
B.

Carrier Fitness

Under its authority to protect consumers, the CAB also
initiated a fitness evaluation 43 that complements the evaluation made by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).44 The CAB evaluation was more general than that
of the FAA and covered the "general management capabilities of an applicant's top management, the adequacy of
the applicant's financial plan, and the record of the owners and top management of the applicant in complying
with state and federal laws and regulations. ' 45 The CAB
plan was designed to ensure that the applicant would operate safely while protecting consumers from dishonest or
incompetent operators. 46 Congress found that "consumers should continue to have the safety and economic protections which result from a CAB fitness investigation,"
and transferred these powers to DOT.4 7
C.

Importance of Legislative History

Because section 1305 preempts state regulation of
rates, routes, and services, the legislative history of the
4' Id. "If there was no Federal regulation, the states might begin to regulate
these areas, and the regulations could vary from state to state. This would be
confusing and burdensome to airline passengers, as well as to the airlines." Id.
4'
H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 3-7. Compare 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305
(1982) with 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. V 1987).
4s H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 6-7.
44 See Federal Aviation Act § 604. "The FAA determines if an applicant has
technically qualified operations and maintenance personnel and whether the applicant has developed the necessary operational and maintenance programs."
H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 7.

4- H.R. REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 7.
46

Id.

47

Id.
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CAB Sunset Act provides an important insight into which
powers Congress was transferring to DOT.4 8 Since Congress transferred these powers as part and parcel of the
ADA regulatory function, they arguably provide the starting point for determining the meaning of rates, routes,
and services, which in turn forms the basis for the remainder of this article's discussion.
III.

WHAT ARE RATES, ROUTES, AND SERVICES?

In order to properly determine whether section 1305
would preempt any available state law claims, a determination of what the phrase "rates, routes, and services" actually means is important.49 In the 1982 Diefenthal v. CAB
decision,50 the Fifth Circuit was faced with interpreting
section 1374(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, which requires an air carrier to provide "adequate service. "51
Although the Fifth Circuit was not required to determine
the meaning of "services" in section 1305, basic rules of
statutory construction dictate that a term should have a
consistent meaning throughout a statute unless a clear intent is demonstrated otherwise.52 Therefore, the meaning
assigned to "services" under section 1374(a) is instructive
in assigning a definition to section 1305 "services."
In Diefenthal, the argument was made that Congress did
not authorize the CAB to "regulate the kind or quality of
service which a carrier provides.15 3 The Fifth Circuit re48 See generally id. at 3-7 (discussing the powers transferred).
49 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1).
o 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983).
Id. at 1043.
I'
-2 In the legislative history of the CAB Sunset Act, Congress specifically stated
that the "Board's basic authority to protect consumers and ensure fair competition comes from a number of provisions in the Federal Aviation Act, including
which was ultimately codified as section 1374. H.R.
Section 404 of the Act ....
REP. No. 793, supra note 35, at 4. Since section 1374 of the Federal Aviation Act
provided the CAB with some of its regulatory powers, the word "service" should
be interpreted consistently throughout the Act. See Barnson v. United States, 816
F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); Firestone v. Howerton,
671 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 929 (1978).
. Diefenthal, 681 F.2d at 1043.
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jected this argument and held that the term "adequate
service" represents the type, kind, and quality of services
provided by a carrier, not merely the number of flights.54
Based upon this decision, the term "services" apparently
has a very broad application. 5
To date, section 1305 has not been utilized to preempt
state law claims against an airline in a personal injury context.56 Section 1305 has been used, however, to preempt
the following state law claims: (1) wrongful exclusion
from an airplane flight;5 7 (2) failure to allow a blind person to sit by an emergency exit;5 (3) avoidance of state
law mandatory drug testing;59 (4) refusal to allow advertising and sale of airline tickets to the general public at a
discount;60 (5) improperly calculating the amount charged
for cancellation of an air travel ticket; 6 ' and (6) deceptive
advertising. 62 Conversely, section 1305 has been interpreted as excluding services that do not specifically relate
to the rates, routes, or services of a title IV carrier, such as
violation of deceptive advertising statutes 63 and challenging an airline's use of its telephone equipment to record
Id. at 1044-48.
other cases dealing with the general meaning of rates, routes, or services
were found. For examples of cases addressing specific factual patterns, see infra
notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
- The defendant in In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver,
Colorado, on November 15, 1987, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988) may have
asserted a section 1305 preemption argument, but it was not mentioned in the
court's opinion. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the preemption of DTPA personal injury claims, see infra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
57 O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3158 (1989); Kohl v. Air New Orleans, Inc., No. 87-4638 (E.D. La. Aug. 17,
1989) (LEXIS 10153, Genfed Library, Dist file).
s8 Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.
Iii. 1988), aff'd, 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989).
61 Stone v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 86-C-5783 (N.D. I1. Feb. 19, 1987)
(LEXIS 1183, Genfed library, Dist File).
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989),
aff'd, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
63 See Abrams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
-4

55 No
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conversations without notification.6 4 Given the myriad of
decisions, the suggested conclusion is that state law claims
are preempted if they relate directly to an airline's rates,
routes, or services.
IV.

CONTROVERSIES AND QUESTIONS SURROUNDING
SECTION 1305

Section 1506,65 commonly known as a "savings
clause ' 66 statute, explictly states that the remedies of the
Federal Aviation Act are not exclusive. 67 Unlike the adoption of section 1305, none of the legislative history of the
1958 congressional session relates to this provision. Case
law, however, has provided an interpretation of the scope
of section 1506.68 In general, courts have acknowledged
(holding that section 1305 does not expressly preempt New York's deceptive advertising laws).
- Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236 (1988) (holding that certain telephone operations were not peculiar to airlines).
65 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Savings clauses generally refer to provisions within federal statutes that "preserve" state laws or other state remedies. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985) (discussing ERISA savings clause); Taylor v.
General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1781 (1990) (discussing automobile manufacturer's tort liability under savings
clause).
07 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506. "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." Id.
6 See, e.g., Nader v; Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (common
law tort action based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by air carrier subject to regulation by the CAB did not have to be stayed pending determination by
the CAB whether such actions were "deceptive"); Bieneman v. City of Chicago,
864 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2100 (1989) (savings
clause preserves common law remedies even when federal law exclusively determines the content of substantive rules); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport onJune 14, 1975, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
provision of New York's General Business Law prohibiting operation of an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner was not preempted by federal statute); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1338, 1345-46 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(claims under both state common law and unfair trade practices act for discontinuing service were not preempted by federal regulation of air travel); Rosdail v.
Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 687 (D. Colo. 1969) (Congress did not
intend to replace the legal relationships created by state common law or statute
with respect to tort liability); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Cal. 3d 540, 691
P.2d 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985) (holding
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that section 1506 preserves state law remedies. Some
courts, however, have made no attempt to reconcile sections 1305 and 1506.
A.

Does Section 1305 Conflict With Section 1506?

Because section 1305 specifically preempts any state
law relating to rates, routes, and services and section 1506
indicates that the federal remedies are not exclusive, an
inherent conflict appears to exist between these provisions. Courts have had some difficulty in resolving this
conflict. Cases in which courts have confronted the potential conflict between sections 1305 and 1506 fall into the
following categories: (1) decisions before the 1978 effective date of section 1305;69 (2) decisions after 1978 that
do not mention section 1305;70 and (3) decisions after
1978 that attempt to reconcile the sections. 7 '
1. Pre-1978 Decisions
Obviously, the conflict issue did not arise in decisions
rendered before the 1978 enactment of section 1305.
The discussions in some of those decisions, however,
foreshadow the enacted version of section 1305.
One of the cases most often cited by advocates who
claim that section 1305 does not totally preempt state law
claims is Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 72 Nader involved a
common law tort action based upon alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation
for "bumping"
a passenger.73
that no question exists as to the intent of Congress to allow the states to apply
their own laws in tort actions against aircraft manufacturers for the defective design of airplanes).
- For a discussion of the pre-1978 cases, see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
70 For a discussion of the post-1978 cases that ignore the conflict issue, see infra
notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
71 For a discussion of post-1978 cases addressing the conflict issue, see infra
notes 92-135 and accompanying text.
72Nader,426 U.S. at 298. For additional discussion, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
" "Bumping" results when an airline overbooks a certain flight and then is
forced to "bump" passengers in accordance with a specified policy in order to
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Although the Supreme Court determined that section
1506 "saved" the state law claims, Justice White's concurring opinion seemed to predict the future: "It may be that
under its rulemaking authority the Board would have
power to order airline overbooking and to pre-empt recoveries under state law for undisclosed overbooking or
74
for overselling. But it has not done so, at least as yet."
In Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit also recognized the power of Congress to preempt
state law. In dicta, the court stated that Congress' commerce clause powers allowed preemption of state laws regarding liability for injuries resulting from air crashes.
The court, however, was not convinced that Congress indicated any such intent to supersede state laws related to
the operation of aircraft. 76 Although both Nader and Rogers were decided before the enactment of section 1305,
they are significant in that the Supreme Court and the
Fifth Circuit recognized the inherent power of Congress
to preempt state laws with respect to aviation.77
2.

Decisions Ignoring Section 1305

Since Congress enacted section 1305 in 1978, courts
have decided several cases that concern the preservation
of state law claims pursuant to section 1506. The decisions discussed below, however, do not mention section
1305, and the courts conveniently avoided resolution of
any potential conflict between sections 1305 and 1506.
Although In re Air Crash Disasterat John F. Kennedy InternationalAirport on June 24, 1975 78 was decided by the Second Circuit after the addition of section 1305, the opinion
accommodate all passengers. See 14 C.F.R. § 250.1-250.11 (bumping regulations); see also Roman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1160, 1163-64 (E.D. Ill.
1977)(holding that overbooking alone does not give rise to an action for violating
the FAA regulations).
74 Nader, 426 U.S. at 308 (White, J., concurring).
7s 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
76 Id.
7 Nader, 426 U.S. at 298; Rogers, 435 F.2d at 1393.
7" 635 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafterJFK Air Crash].
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does not address this statute.7 9 The only mention of section 1506 in the decision is a very cursory statement that
"the federal statute does not preclude common law remedies." ' 80 The court appeared to state in dicta that the submission of state law standards to the jury was harmless
error. Federal preemption under section 1305 and its
impact on section 1506 was not discussed.82
In Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,83 the court determined that a Pennsylvania deceptive trade practices
statute was not preempted. 84 The court discussed various
air travel regulations but decided that section 1506 specifically preserves the legal remedies of air travelers beyond
those set forth in the Federal Aviation Act. 5 This discussion appears to focus upon the defendant's argument that
the FAA intended to preempt state regulation through the
extensive regulatory scheme.86 Again, section 1305 was
not mentioned. 7
Similarly, in In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton InternaId at 74.
0 Id.
1 See id. at 74-75. Although the court did not specifically indicate that the submission of the New York business statute was harmless error, the court apparently
reached that conclusion. The statute at issue simply provided that operation of an
aircraft in a careless manner that endangered the life or property of others was
prohibited. Id. at 74 n.4. The court further stated that the lower court only instructed the jury to determine if the law had any application to the facts and that
the question of whether the pilot was reckless was a fact question for the jury. Id.
at 74-75.
79

83

See id. at 67.
541 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Pa. 1982).

84

Id.

85

Id. at 1345.

82

86Id. Although the defendant's pleadings were not reviewed, the court in dicta
noted the extensive federal regulation in the field of aviation, Specifically, the
court stated that "while federal regulation of air travel is extensive; it is not exclusive." Id. Further, the court found that the "plaintiffs' claims under both the common law of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law would remain unaffected by this federal regulation of
air travel." Id. at 1346. Based upon the court's discussions, it appears that the
defendant did not argue for section 1305 preemption but rather contended that
the federal government impliedly preempted the field of aviation through extensive regulation.
87

See id. at 1338.
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tional Airport, Denver, Colorado, on November 15, 1987,88 the
court concluded that "[r]egulation of the conduct of commercial air carriers through the Federal Aviation Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder does not preempt
traditional tort remedies which have the effect of regulating that same conduct." 89 In support of this holding, the
court cited a number of decisions.9 0 Each of these cases
discuss section 1506, but they do not provide an explanation for the conflict between sections 1305 and 1506.
Although the statute had been in effect for almost ten
years, each court failed to mention section 1305."'
3.

Cases Attempting to Reconcile Sections 1305 and 1506

Many courts have "taken the bull by the horns" and attempted to reconcile the apparent conflict between sections 1305 and 1506. The courts that have undertaken
this analysis are divisible into two categories: (1) those
deciding that section 1305 totally preempts state law
claims; 92 and (2) those deciding that section 1305
preempts only state law claims that conflict with the federal regulations.93
a. Section 1305 Preempts State Law Claims
The first category includes cases holding that section
1305 totally preempts all state law claims. In O'Carrollv.
American Airlines, Inc.,94 the Fifth Circuit specifically addressed the conflict between sections 1305 and 1506 in an
action for wrongful removal of the plaintiff from an airmo721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988) [hereinafter Stapleton Air Crash].
Id. at 1187.
Nader, 426 U.S. at 298-300; JFK Air Crash, 635 F.2d at 74; Rosdail, 297 F.
Supp. at 684-85; Elsworth, 37 Cal. 3d at 540, 691 P.2d at 630; 208 Cal. Rptr. at
879; People v. Valentino, 153 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 35, 200 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984); Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118, 1122 (Me. 1977).
m See Stapleton Air Crash, 721 F. Supp. at 1185.
92 For a discussion of total preemption cases, see infra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
9.1For a discussion of partial preemption cases, see infra notes 124-135 and accompanying text.
- 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3158 (1989).
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plane. 95 The court reasoned that Congress clearly intended to preempt state law because section 1305 was
enacted well after section 1506.96 The court further held
that section 1305 expressly preempted state law claims. 97
In a factually similar case, Kohl v. Air New Orleans, Inc. ,98 a
district court in Louisiana followed O'Carroll in holding
that all state law claims arising from the alleged wrongful
removal of the plaintiff from the airplane were preempted
by the Federal Aviation Act and should be dismissed. 99
In Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,'00 the Ninth Circuit also analyzed the conflict between sections 1305 and
1506 and found that the state law claims were preempted.
The plaintiff contended that certain common law remedies were available and that the airline had violated a California statute relating to equal access for the blind.' 0 '
The plaintiff further argued that California laws were not
in conflict with the federal law and should survive under
section 1506.102 The Ninth Circuit stated that this argument missed the point because section 1305 "is not limited to those state laws that conflict with federal law. It
preempts state laws and regulations 'relating to rates,
routes, or services.' "'Do The court determined that since

the California statute would regulate the services of an air
carrier, it would be preempted, notwithstanding the savings clause in section 1506.104
French v. Pan Am Express, Inc. l0 5 addressed the issue of
whether section 1305 preempted a Rhode Island statute
that required drug testing of pilots. In an unequivocal de9.,
Id. at 12.
- Id. at 13.
97 Id.
98 No. 87-4638 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 1989) (LEXIS 10153, Genfed library, Dist

file).

Id. at LEXIS 10153 p.1 . But see Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F.
Supp. 1164 (E.D. La. 1989) (distinguishing O'Carroll).
too743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984).
-

to,Id. at 1415.
102 Id. at 1415-16.
-3 Id. at 1415.
104

Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1416 n.ll.

,o5869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
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cision that the statute was preempted, the First Circuit
stated:
We infer from the Federal Aviation Act an unmistakably
clear intent to occupy the field of pilot regulation related
to air safety, to the exclusion of state law. In our judgment, such an intent is implicit in the pervasiveness of relevant federal regulation, the dominance of the federal
interest, and the legislative goal of establishing a single,
uniform system of control over air safety.'" 6
Once again, the argument was made that the Rhode Island statute did not conflict with federal goals. 0 7 The
court, however, held that as long as Congress intended to
occupy an envisioned field, any state law falling within
that field is preempted. 018 In other words, once Congress
has appropriately legislated in a field, any state's attempt
to regulate within that field is invalidated despite the level
of compatibility with federal policies. Federal interests
are necessarily predominant, and states are powerless to
regulate in those preempted areas.' 0 9
Likewise, Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines," 0
held that a state law claim seeking to impose liability on
an airline for differences in ticket prices was preempted by
section 1305. The court also recognized the following:
(1) preemption is not limited to state laws or regulations
that conflict with federal law; and (2) any state law that
could cause rates for airline tickets in one state to differ
from those in other states is preempted."' The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the decision 1 and held that "[a]lthough
[section 1506] preserves state common law from implicit
preemption, the preemption here [section 1305] is express rather than implied. If the state law relates to 'rates,
- Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6.
-8 Id. at 6-7.
107

'

Id. at 6.

- 682 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. 11. 1988), aft'd, 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989).
"' Id. at 379.
119Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1989).
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routes, or services,' the absence of contrary federal law is
irrelevant." 1 3
Perhaps the most far reaching opinion to date was delivered in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox," 4 in which the
court granted an injunction against the Texas Attorney
General. The court enjoined the attorney general from
bringing an enforcement action under the Texas DTPA
for alleged false advertising practices. 1 5 Although the
court did not specifically mention section 1305, it held
that "it is probable that Plaintiffs will prevail in establishing their claims that any state regulation of advertising of
the Plaintiffs' rates, routes, and services has been preempted
by the Federal Government ....
Given the fact that
this language tracks section 1305 word for word, the court
apparently considered the preemption statute in granting
the injunction.' '7 Thirty-three
addtional states were later
t8
added to the injunction."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunc"13 Id. at 754. Preemption may be express or implied. See Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620,
625 (1st Cir. 1987). Whether preemption is express or implied, the question
whether federal law preempts a state statute is one of congressional intent. See
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, (1987); Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986); Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 365, 369 (1986). Express preemption exists when
state laws are blunted by explicit direction of Congress. Implied preemption is a
more subtle creature. French, 869 F.2d at 2. The Supreme Court has described
the difference as follows: Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy a
given field to the exclusion of state law. Such a purpose properly may be inferred
where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by
the State, where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or where
"the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it ...reveal the same purpose." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted). Finally, even when Congress has
not entirely displaced state regulation in a particular field, state law is preempted
if it actually conflicts with federal law. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293 (1988).
14 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aft'd, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
115Id. at 101.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 Compare 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 with the court's holding quoted in the text.
'",
Mattox, 712 F. Supp. at 105; see also supra note 17 for a list of the thirty-three
states.
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tion. i 9 The court held in its affirmation that state laws
prohibiting deception in advertisements of airline rates
are preempted by federal law.' 20 That is, section 1305
was held to expressly preempt DTPAs because such acts
"relate to" airline rates and section 1506 cannot save
2
remedies expressly preempted.' '
In addition to the cases discussed above, other cases
have also held that section 1305 preempts state law
claims. 122 These cases, however, did not focus upon implied preemption. Instead, section 1305 was viewed as an
express intention to preempt state law in the area of rates,
routes, and services. 2 3 Other courts, as discussed below,
have focused upon implied preemption and evaluated the
degree of conflict between the federal and state laws to
determine if preemption occurred.
1,9 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990). Given
that the Fifth Circuit in O'Carroll explicitly decided that section 1305 provides a
"[c]lear indication of Congressional intent to preempt and is controlling," the
afffirmation of the injunction on appeal was expected. See O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at
13. For further discussion of DTPA preemption, see infra notes 168-185 and accompanying text.
120Mattox, 897 F.2d at 780-83.
I2I Id.
'2 See, e.g., Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986) (section 1305 is a preemption statute that establishes the federal government's sphere of power over the states in areas of interstate air transportation); Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 88-C-8158. (N.D.
Il. Oct. 24, 1988) (LEXIS 12026, Genfed library, Dist file) (while it is not wholly
inconceivable that a preemption defense may be made to plaintiff's state law
claims in state court, defendant appears to be facing an uphill battle); Stone v.
American Airlines, No. 86-C-5783 (N.D. I1. Feb. 19, 1987)(LEXIS 1183, Genfed
library, Dist file) (resolution of state law claims would necessarily relate to rates
charged by airline for cancellation of airline tickets and are therefore preempted
under section 1305); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985)
(the legislative history is clear that this Act and regulations issued thereunder preempted any state laws relating to air carrier service), aft'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (a state law obligation to give courteous service is expressly preempted by
section 1305); New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D.
Mass. 1985) (air carrier's complaint states a cause of action under the supremacy
clause to the extent a commission's action is alleged to constitute a law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision affecting its rates, routes, or services).
12. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text regarding implied and express
preemption.
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If State Law Conflicts with Federal Law Section 1305
Preempts

The second category of cases interpreting the conflict
of sections 1305 and 1506 includes those decisions'holding that section 1305 applies only if the state law is incompatible with the federal law. In People v. Western Airlines,
Inc.,124 a California court conducted an analysis of sections 1305 and 1506. Relying upon Nader, the court found
that state regulation of interstate air carriers is preempted
only where the federal and state regulatory schemes are
irreconcilable. 2 5 This matter involved an appeal of the
lower court's determination that the claims were preempted as a matter of law.' 2 6 On appeal, the state argued
that "the People do not challenge Western's rates, routes
or services. The People's complaint involves the [distinct]
issue of the manner [in which] Western advertised its
rates and services. 49 United States Code section 1305(a)
does not insulate Western from liability for violating
Cali' 27
fornia statutes prohibiting false advertising.'
Interestingly, the court suggested that the result might
have been different if evidence of inconsistencies between
California and federal law had been introduced. Since the
record did not reflect any inconsistencies between the
state advertising statutes and section 1305, assertion of
only incidental effects arising from liability under the state
law was insufficient to establish preemption. 2 8 Accord,24155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237, 238 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1132 (1985).
12- Id. at 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 238. For a discussion of Nader, see supra notes
72-77 and accompanying text,
126 Western Airlines, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
127 Id. (citation omitted).
128 Id. at 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
Nothing in this record suggests any inconsistency between California's false advertising statutes and the Federal Aviation Program
precluding as a matter of law their coexistence here; any assertion of
more than incidental impact on rates resulting from California imposing liability on Western for false advertising or from Western
adopting practices to avoid such liability involves factual issues beyond the scope of demurrer. On this record the People's complaint is
not preempted by federal law.
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ingly, the case was reversed.' 29
In Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,13o the court also determined that section 1305 preempts only those state law
claims that conflict with federal laws. Specifically, the
court found that the state law claims were not in conflict
with any Federal Aviation Act provisions and, therefore,
no preemption resulted.' 3 ' Apparently ignoring the requisites of express preemption, the court found that section 1305 was "not preemption based on pervasive
federal regulation, but preemption due to interference or
1' 32
conflict with federal law.'
Given the fact that section 1305 constitutes an express
preemption of any law, rule, or regulation that relates to
rates, routes, or services, 3 3 an analysis of the inconsisten34
cies between state and federal rules is unnecessary.
Thus, if any state law, rule, or regulation relates to rates,
routes, or services, section 1305 should preempt it
whether or not it is consistent with any similar federal
13 5
laws.
B.

Is Section 1305 a Federal Question Statute?

Along with the discussion of preemption, an analysis of
the issue of whether section 1305 constitutes a federal
question for removal purposes is essential. 136 Normally, a
Id.(emphasis added).
12

Id.

,so723 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. La. 1989); for additional discussion of Saley, see
infra note 157.
sI Id. at 1166.
1'
Id. Since inconsistencies between state and federal regulations are examined only if implied preemption exists, the court must have determined that
express preemption did not exist. See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 208-09 (1985) (holding that without express preemption a state statute will
be upheld if it does not conflict with federal law); Paige v. HenryJ, Kaiser Co., 826
F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that without express preemption state law
is only displaced when it conflicts with or frustrates the federal scheme); supra
notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
,,-49 U.S.C. app. § 1305.
14 See Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1415; Mattox, 897 F.2d at 779.
I".
Hingson, at 1415-16; French, 869 F.2d at 6.
1- If Congress has demonstrated an intent to totally preempt an area of law,
such as in ERISA and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, then
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defendant is faced with the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule 37 because the plaintiff is asserting state law claims
and not federal claims. However, when Congress has indicated an intent to preempt an area of law, courts have
held that the well-pleaded complaint rule will not prevent
removal of the matter to federal court.1 3 8 Arguably, section 1305 represents an explicit congressional intent to
preempt state law completely with respect to the regula39
tion of rates, routes, and services of a title IV carrier.1
The courts, however, have not yet reached a consistent
conclusion.
1. Section 1305 Constitutes a Federal Question
Those courts which have concluded that section 1305
constitutes a federal question for removal purposes find
that Congress statutorily indicated an intent to totally preempt the field of law relating to the rates, routes, and
services of a title IV carrier. 40 In Stone v. American Airlines,
any claim relating to that particular field would constitute a federal question for
removal purposes. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
Thus, if section 1305 is a statute similar to ERISA, a defendant may be able to
remove a state court proceeding to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction if the state law claim relates to the rates, routes, or services of a title IV
carrier.
1,7 The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that if the plaintiff's pleading on
its face does not state a federal question, then any federal preemption argument
would be defensive in nature and would not provide grounds for removal. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63; Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
876 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1989).
Aaron, 876 F.2d at 1161; see Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitte, 452 U.S.
394, 396 (1981); Oliva v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 651 F. Supp.
369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that if the real nature of a complaint is federal,
removal jurisdiction is proper regardless of whether a plaintiff pleads his claims in
state law); Bowlus v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 914, 918
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Triple A Maintenance Corp. v. Bevona, 657 F. Supp. 1171, 117273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
I- For a discussion of congressional intent, see supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
,4o State v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. 3-89-0713-H (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 19, 1989); Stone, No. 86-C-5783 (LEXIS 1183, Genfed Library, Dist file); see
also Mattox, 897 F.2d at 787 (holding that the legislative history of section 1305
exhibits a congressional intent to treat a complaint raising this select group of
claims as necessarily federal in character).
138
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Inc. ,t't the court specifically stated that "the effect of Section 1305(a)(1) ... is to preempt state court jurisdiction
over the instant suit since resolution of the claims therein
would necessarily relate to rates charged by [the] defendant for cancellation of airline tickets. Jurisdiction over the
dispute is thus exclusively federal."'142 Additionally, in declining to remand a section 1305 matter, a federal district
court in Texas held that the case arose under federal law,
which is indicative of the federal government's
pervasive
4
regulation of the airline industry.1
2.

Section 1305 Does Not Provide a Basisfor Removal

A number of cases, however, have determined that section 1305 does not constitute a federal question for removal purposes. 44 The fundamental arguments asserted
by these courts generally involve two theories. That is,
courts hold either that the well-pleaded complaint rule
precludes removal' 45 or that state laws were not totally
preempted by Congress.146
a.

The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Courts that rely upon the well-pleaded complaint rule
to deny removal base that decision upon the fact that section 1305 preemption constitutes a defense to any state
law claim that is not subject to removal. 147 Implicit in this
,4 No. 86-C-5783 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1987) (1987 LEXIS 1183).
5
142 Id. at LEXIS 1183 p. .
14'
Texas v. Pan American, No. 3-89-0713-H.
144 People v. Trans World Airlines, 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); People v.
Trans World Airlines, 720 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Wolens, No. 88-C-8158
(LEXIS 12026, Genfed library, Dist file); Woist v. American Airlines, Inc., 668 F.
Supp. 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
145 See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 150-155 and accompanying text.
14
People v. Trans World, 728 F. Supp. at 184 (although federal preemption is
usually a federal defense, if it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, then removal to federal court is not authorized); People v. Trans World,
720 F. Supp. at 828 (a defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction because of
section 1305 defenses); Wolens, at LEXIS 12026 p. 2 (section 1305 and its legislative history provide no indication of congressional intent to convert state claims
into federal actions and defendant cannot plead preemption to remove to federal
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decision is the determination that section 1305 does not
completely preempt the area of rates, routes, or services
of a title IV carrier.' 48 This logic, however, is contrary to
the express language of section 1305, which Congress labeled as a "preemption" statute.' 49 Accordingly, to comply with congressional intent, section 1305 should allow
for removal of the matter to federal court if the state law
claim relates to rates, routes, or services of a title IV
carrier.
b. Assertions of PartialCongressionalPreemption
As an alternative to relying solely upon the wellpleaded complaint rule, 50 some courts have also found
that the state law claim did not relate to the rates, routes,
or services of a title IV carrier.'15 In People v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,152 the court discussed whether New York's
regulation of deceptive advertising related to the airline's
rates, routes, or services. Interestingly, the court held
that the relationship was too remote, and the implied conclusion is that section 1305 has no application in this instance.' 53 The court later recognized the exception to the
court); Wolst, 668 F. Supp. at 1119-20 (section 1305 cannot be fairly read as barring state courts from entertaining lawsuits against air carriers, and it is well settled that such a defense does not provide a predicate for removal).
148 If such a determination had been made, the cases would have been properly
removed. See, e.g., People v.Trans World, 720 F. Supp. at 829.
14949 U.S.C. app. § 1305. The legislative history provides an indication that
Congress intended to totally preempt state regulation of only the rates, routes,
and services of title IV carriers. Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of the entire field of aviation. Therefore, if a state law, rule, or regulation
relates to rates, routes, or services of a title IV carrier, then any claim based on a
violation of such state law, rule, or regulation should be removable. See supra
notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
-,For a discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see supra notes 137,
147-149 and accompanying text.
,"'
People v. Trans World, 728 F. Supp. at 162 (holding that any relationship between New York's enforcement of its laws against deceptive advertising and the
airline's rates, routes, or services is remote and indirect); Air Transp. Assoc. of
Am. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1236 (1988) (holding that regulation of telephone operations is not related
to rates, routes, or services).
1-12 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
153 Id.
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well-pleaded complaint rule but determined that the Federal Aviation Act had "not completely preempted state
regulation of airline advertising," apparently because the
New York regulation did not relate to rates, routes, or
services. 154
In contrast to the decisions based upon the wellpleaded complaint rule, the decisions holding that the
state law claims do not relate to rates, routes, or services
are consistent with the express wording of section
1305.155 At this time, however, the issue of whether a
state or federal court should make the determination that
a particular claim relates to rates, routes, or services is
1 56
undecided.
V.

WHAT CAUSES OF ACTION ARE AVAILABLE?

If a plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by section
1305, a situation may arise where the plaintiff has no
cause of action.15 7 Prior to 1975, Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp. 158 and In re ParisAir Crash of March 3, 1974159 held
that there was a private cause of action to enforce violations of federal standards. In August 1975, however, the
-. Id. at 184. The district court's analysis raises an interesting question about

section 1305. For instance, if the court had determined that the plaintiff's allegations related to the rates, routes, or services of a title IV carrier, its conclusion
about removal might have been different. Logically, since the interpretation of a
federal statute is involved in the determination of the meaning of the phrase "relates to rates, routes, or services," removal may be appropriate to allow a federal
court to make this determination. This issue, however, remains unanswered.
,-1Since section 1305 expressly preempts certain state law regulations, any decision finding that this statute merely constitutes a defense and not a federal question would be inconsistent with the statute's "preemption" title.
156 See supra note 154.
,57In Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. La. 1989), the
court recognized that the plaintiff did not have a claim and attempted to remedy
the situation by concluding that 49 U.S.C. § 1374 was repealed January 1, 1985.
Id. at 1166. Section 1374, however, was amended by Congress in 1986 and 1987.
Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-202, 1329 (1988).
Thus, section 1374 remains an enforceable statute despite the court's conclusion
to the contrary.
" 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
155,

399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash '60 and listed four factors to evaluate in deciding whether Congress intended to
create a private cause of action. 61 Since Cort, federal
courts that have addressed the question whether a private
right of action for violations of the Federal Aviation Act
exists have unequivocally
determined that no private right
62
of action is available.'
When federal law totally preempts state law claims relating to a title IV carrier's rates, routes, or services, the
plaintiff is then left with only federal common law or federal statutory claims. 16 This scenario, however, should
result in the application of state common law remedies
because federal courts look to state law if federal common
law fails to address the allegations." 6 But, federal courts
do not look to consumer protection statutes, such as the
Texas DTPA, because these statutes are legislative, not
- 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Id. The Supreme Court utilized the following four part test in Cort to determine if Congress intended to create a private cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
161

statute was enacted ....Second, is there any indication of legislative

intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the

legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ...And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action solely on
federal law?
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
162See Gabel, 350 F. Supp. at 612 (holding a private cause of action exists); Paris
Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 732 (holding a private cause of action exists). Cases that
have held otherwise include: Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir.
1987); In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 408 (9th Cir.
1983); Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946, 951 (E.D. Va. 1980); Heckel v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278, 281 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Yelinek v. Worley,
284 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445,
450-51 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
163This article does not address the dilemma plaintiffs may encounter if federal
common law and federal statutory claims are asserted after expiration of the statute of limitations, while all state law claims asserted within the limitations period
may be preempted.
l- 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4514 (1982). In many cases, relevant factors may indicate that the federal courts
should follow or "adopt" state law as the rule of decision, although it will be
doing so as a matter of federal law. Id.
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common law, creations.165 Total preemption of the
DTPA for title IV carriers is appropriate for the following
reasons: (1) the federal government clearly intended to
provide consumer protection for airline customers;1 66 and
(2) the application of federal rules would provide1 67consistent criteria for the individual airlines to follow.
A. Preemption of the Texas DTPA
The fundamental purpose of the Texas DTPA is to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive
business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches
of warranty. 68 One of the fundamental elements of a
DTPA action is that it can be brought only by a consumer.1 69 A consumer is defined as an individual, a partnership or corporation, or a state or one of its
subdivisions or agencies who seeks or acquires goods or
services by purchase or lease. "70 Similar "consumer protection statutes" have been enacted in most of the states
and provide a myriad of different standards of conduct for
an airline to follow depending upon the applicable state
statute. 7 1 In order to provide a consistent framework
within which title IV carriers could operate, Congress,
through section 1305, attempted to preclude application
of these consumer statutes whenever rates, routes, or
services were involved. 172
165 Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (holding that the DTPA
does not represent a codification of the common law); see generally Joseph v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 674 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
This article specifically addresses the preemption of only the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.
66 For a discussion of the legislative history of the CAB and CAB Sunset Acts,
see supra notes 24-25, 34-42 and accompanying text.
167 For a discussion of consistency in airline industry regulation, see supra note
29 and accompanying text.
,-" TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987).
t-;

Id. § 17.50(a).

Id. § 17.45(4).
For a general discussion of state consumer protection statutes, see supra
notes 12-13.
172 For a discussion of uniformity in regulation, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
170
17,
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A review of the basic goals of the ADA reveals the same
fundamental purposes as the DTPA."7 3 The legislative
history suggests that Congress intended for the federal
government to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices in order to promote consistency in the regulation of title IV carriers. 7 4 In order to achieve this
consistency, Congress specifically adopted section 1305 to
preempt any state rules, regulations, or other provisions
that relate in any manner to title IV carriers' rates, routes,
175
or services.
The language of section 1305 is very clear. The statute
does not purport to preempt all state aviation rules and
regulations. It merely restricts any regulation of title IV
76
carriers in the areas of rates, routes, and services.
Given the history of the ADA indicating a congressional
intent to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive
practices, and the subsequent adoption of section 1305,
application of the DTPA to any area of an airline's rates,
77
routes, or services is preempted.
Although the courts have disagreed as to whether various nonpersonal injury claims relate to rates, routes, or
services, 1'7 no doubt exists that a DTPA personal injury
claim is preempted by section 1305. Since only consumers can bring a DTPA action, 179 and a consumer is defined
as one who seeks or acquires goods or services, . 80 title IV
,7- Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act gives the CAB authority to proceed
against unfair or deceptive practices. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text. The legislative history of unfair and deceptive practices indicates that Congress intended to protect consumers. See supra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text. Regulation, however, is necessary not only to protect consumers but also to promote consistency in the regulation of title IV common carriers. See supra note 41.
174 For a discussion of the legislative history, see supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
175 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305.
176 Id.
177 Although there appear to be inconsistencies among the cases addressing
DTPA preemption, the fundamental concept remains that if the state law claim
relates to rates, routes, or services, it is preempted. See supra notes 94-135.
178 For a discussion of such decisions, see supra notes 57-64.
,79 TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a).
,go Id. § 17.45(4).

152

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[56

carriers would be subject to liability because they provide
services to their ticket holders.""' Section 1305, however,
preempts state law claims relating to rates, routes, or services,11 2 and since consumer DTPA claims must necessarily
relate to a carrier's services, the personal injury cause of
action is preempted by section 1305. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,' 8 3 the Fifth Circuit also held that section 1305 expressly preempted state deceptive advertising
laws, such as DTPAs, as they relate to airline fare advertising. 84 Therefore, in the future, courts may expand this
line of reasoning in Texas to hold that DTPA actions
against title IV carriers by consumers of services must, by
definition, relate to a carrier's services and would be preempted by section 1305.185
B.

Application of FederalLaw

The federal government has undeniably attempted to
regulate the aviation industry consistently and to create
uniform standards for consumer services.186 By applying
federal common law and the related federal rules to title
IV carriers, consistent standards of conduct, services, and
operations in interstate travel are attained without prejudice to consumer rights. Through the enactment of section 1305, Congress intended to preempt consumer
protection statutes, such as DTPAs, to provide a consistent regulatory base within which a title IV carrier could
operate.
19,Although an air carrier does provide some meals and possibly other goods
during flight, the fundamental purpose of an air carrier is to provide the service of
flying a passenger from point A to point B.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305.
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
1.4 Id.
18-For the same reasoning found in personal injury actions, any DTPA action
against a title IV carrier would be preempted because by definition a consumer
would have to seek services from a carrier. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text. The only exception may be if goods were involved in the transaction
since section 1305 does not purport to preempt any state regulation of goods. 49
U.S.C. app. § 1305. This is not to say that all common law causes of action would
also be preempted by section 1305. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
'19 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Although section 1305 has been on the books for over88a

decade,' 8 7 its application in litigation is relatively new.1

Many questions as to the scope and effects of section 1305
remain unanswered. This article, however, emphasizes
the benefits of concluding that section 1305 preempts
state laws governing the rates, routes, and services of interstate air carriers. For example, national consistency is
promoted when rates, routes, and services are directly
regulated only by the federal government. Additionally,
common law theories, such as negligence, remain viable
claims through the application of federal common law.
Title IV airlines can also evaluate their rates, routes, and
services against uniform standards provided by the federal regulations. State-by-state modifications of rates,
routes, and services will no longer be required because
individual business practice statutes do not apply. Finally,
consumers will no longer have the liberal protection of
the state business practice laws, but they will still receive
federal protection. In summary, although many questions
about section 1305 remain unanswered, the benefits of
uniformity delineated above strongly support the conclusion that any state laws which relate in any manner to a
title IV air carrier's rates, routes, or services are preempted generally by the federal regulatory scheme and
spcifically by section 1305.

49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 was first enacted in 1978.
- For a discussion of cases applying section 1305, see supra notes 56-64 and
accompanying text.
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